US a partner in Israeli war
By JAMAL KANJ
Thursday, November 15, 2012
ON November 15, 1988, the Palestine Liberation
Organisation's (PLO) National Council, a supreme body representing all
Palestinians, declared an independent Palestinian state.
The metaphoric gesture did not change life for Palestinians
under occupation or in exile, but that wasn't the intention.
The pronouncement was sugar coating major, unreciprocated
political concessions, for the declaration also endorsed Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, and implicitly recognised Israel - complying with US
conditions to open communication channels between the two parties.
But why did these United Nations resolutions become so
critical in America's political lexis?
More than a decade earlier, Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger bestowed on Israel special powers over US policy in the Middle East.
In 1975, he pledged there would be no negotiation with the
PLO as long as it did not recognise Israel and accepted UN Resolutions 242 and
338.
Since Jimmy Carter's presidency, PLO overtures to overcome
Kissinger's concocted predicament were stonewalled in Washington.
In 1982, I was privy to one instance of backdoor
negotiations when Ronald Reagan's administration and the PLO were on the verge
of establishing formal contacts. That summer I was in Washington, DC, helping
the national office of the Palestine Congress (PC) of North America.
The PC was an umbrella organisation representing Americans
of Palestinian descent and we were in direct contact with PLO chairman Yasser
Arafat's office during the Israeli siege of Beirut.
The Internet was still a proprietary of the US Army, but the
telex machine allowed us instantaneous text-based messaging even during the
heaviest Israel shelling on PLO centres in the Lebanese capital.
The long blockade and the wanton destruction, including
cutting off power and water supplies to the city, prompted the Arab League to
dispatch Saudi and Syrian foreign ministers to Washington to seek access for
humanitarian support for the besieged city.
A secret delegation member was the late Khalid Al Hassan of
the PLO Central Committee and a high ranking member of the Fatah organisation.
He was allowed to enter the US despite a ban on PLO members.
Following the ministers' meetings with officials from the
State Department, Al Hassan asked to relay an urgent communiquŽ to the PLO
chairman's office. The message was for Arafat to issue a statement, recognising
242 and 338.
In return, the US administration promised to instruct the
late Philip Habib, the American mediator in Beirut at the time, to negotiate
directly with the PLO.
Within minutes, Arafat was dictating his response: "You
are selling me fish in the sea." This Arabic proverb meant that the offer
wasn't firm enough.
Regardless, Al Hassan must have established phone contact
with Arafat - who the next day, and after a meeting with US Congressmen Pete
McCloskey from California and Paul Findley of Illinois, declared his acceptance
of all UN resolutions pertinent to Palestine.
However, the declaration - not mentioning explicitly 242 and
338 - was inadequate for the US government to overcome Kissinger's commitment
to Israel.
Israel and its lobby became alarmed at the looming spectre
of contacts between the US and the PLO. They responded by making it unlawful
for Reagan or future American administrations to negotiate with the PLO.
The America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) enlisted
Israeli firsters in Congress to codify the pledge into US law. It passed in
1984 and to top Kissinger, Congress approved additional conditions on the PLO.
Kissinger's vow and AIPAC's irrational supremacy over
Congress and the White House have turned America into an inferior partner in
Israel's maniacal, bloody and political wars.
Today, US opposition to Palestine getting Observer State
status at the UN is inseparable from Israel's continued attempts to drag
America into the abyss of hate and conflict.
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